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Abstract 
The way linguistic messages are “packaged” in political discourse often reflects evidentially-
based criteria and, notably, the intention of the politician to make his epistemic commitment 
more or less manifest in relation to the type of content proffered to the receiver. The present 
paper analyzes the evidential function of presupposition and assertion (apud Masia 2017) in a 
corpus of English, French and Italian political speeches, with the aim of highlighting how these 
units of information structure are strategically resorted to by politicians to modulate their com-
mitment to more or less challengeable types of content. Data show that more challengeable 
content types (i. e. attacks and self-praises) are likely to be encoded as presupposition, which 
reduces the speaker’s commitment to their truth; in contrast, less challengeable content types 
(i. e. neutral/informative and stance-taking) are more likely to be asserted, with the speaker 
showing stronger commitment to their truth. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Information source and speaker attitude evidentiality 
Since Boas’s seminal reports (Boas 1900, 1910) on how the source of information is marked in 
some languages of the Americas, evidentiality has become the plank of much theoretical and 
typological research (Chafe/Nichols 1986; Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004). As already ad-
dressed in much earlier and recent accounts, evidential systems in the world’s languages are 
extremely diversified and display different levels of complexity, with twofold up to six-fold 
paradigms (Aikhenvald 2004). In some recent contention (Aikhenvald 2004; Cornillie 2009), 
the linguistic coding of information source has been characterized as the sole function of evi-
dential markers, distinct from expressions whose function is precisely to signal the speaker’s 
attitude to information, a meaning typically associated with epistemic modality. Already in 
Friedman’s works on Balkan evidentials (Friedman 1986), it emerged that in languages such as 
Bulgarian, Albanian and Macedonian, evidentiality systems conveyed speaker attitude mean-
ings, hinting at stronger or weaker speaker commitments to the truth of a proposition. Building 
on this multi-faceted behavior of evidentials in the world’s languages, Chafe/Nichols (1986) 
put forth a distinction between a “narrow” and a “broad” type of evidentiality, the former mark-
ing the source of information proper, the latter the speaker’s attitude to the truth of a proposi-
tion. In the present paper, I will comply with this characterization of evidentiality, with the view 
to highlighting the non inter-independence of the narrow and broad scope of evidentials, as the 
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adoption of an attitude or perspective on knowledge also entails providing cues on who is the 
source of that knowledge. Below, some examples of information source and speaker attitude 
evidentials in typologically different languages are provided. 
The Wanka Quechua examples in (1) illustrate a case of narrow evidentiality encoded through 
a tripartite system with direct, conjectural/inferential and indirect/reportative evidential markers 
(Aikhenvald 2004: 43). 
(1)      
DIRECT EVIDENTIALITY    
a. Chay-chruu-mi achk wamla-pis walashr-pis alma-ku-lkaa-ña 
 This-loc-dir.evid many girl-too boy-too bathe-refl.-imprf.pl-
nar.pst 
 ‘Many girls and boys were swimming (I saw them).’  
INFERENTIAL/CONJECTURAL EVIDENTIALITY   
b. Daañu pawa-shra-si  ka-ya-n-chr-ari  
 field finish-partitive-eventive  be-imprf-3-infer-emph  
 ‘It (the field) might be completely destroyed (I inferred).’  
INDIRECT/REPORTATIVE EVIDENTIALITY   
c. Ancha-p-shi   wa’a-chi-nki  wamla-a-ta  
 too.much-gen-report.  cry-caus-2  girl-1p-acc  
 ‘You make my daughter cry too much (I’ve been told).’  
The direct evidential -mi in (1a) indicates that the proposition that many boys and girls were 
swimming is first-hand evidence of the speaker. In (1b), the inferential marker chr- classifies 
the probability of the field being destroyed as indirect evidence, which the speaker arrived at 
on the basis of situationally available cues. In (1c), -shi signals that the state of affairs uttered 
is a second-hand report and that someone else is the direct source of it (for other evidential 
markers, cf. Faller 2002, 2011). 
As already said, systems of broad evidentiality were first found in the Balkan linguistic area 
and, particularly, in Bulgarian, Macedonian and Albanian (Friedman 1986). In these languages, 
the speaker’s attitude to truth is encoded by definite and indefinite past forms of verbs. Definite 
forms express a stronger commitment of the speaker to the truth of a proposition, while indefi-
nite forms mark a weaker commitment. For example, in (2), the speaker presents the state of 
affairs as if he indeed had adequate evidence of its truth, although he may in fact have not 
witnessed it at all. 
(2) Beše  tamo    
 Be.pluprf.definite(she) there    
 ‘(She) was there.’   
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Friedman remarks that what differentiates Balkan evidentiality from other strategies of eviden-
tial marking in the world’s languages is the fact that Balkan perfective forms are not dedicated 
evidential markers, but rather “co-opted” strategies existing for the other non evidential pur-
poses. 
These forms are thus not special evidential forms but rather forms contextually capable of ex-
pressing evidentiality. In pluperfect forms which developed later, during or after the rise of evi-
dentiality, it appears that an evidential meaning can be treated as invariant, though it need not be 
treated as a separate grammatical category. 
(Friedman 1986: 169) 
The hypothesis that evidentiality could find encoding in linguistic devices generally devoted to 
non-evidential functions has also been addressed by Aikhenvald (2004) who distinguishes be-
tween “evidential markers” proper and “evidential strategies”. While the former have raised in 
languages to mark evidential meanings only, the latter can be occasionally targeted at express-
ing evidentiality in specific communicative situations. Generally speaking, evidentiality mark-
ing is believed to comply with the need of being precise about one’s source of information or 
reliability of knowledge. Despite the obligatory nature of evidential marking in some languages, 
though, the actual possession of knowledge as well as of adequate evidence of truth is not a 
sine qua non condition for a correct use of evidentials. As also noticed by Aikhenvald (2004: 
98): “one can deliberately use the wrong evidential with the correct information”, and so the 
ties between the use of evidential markers and the real epistemic status of contents are much 
looser than commonly believed (Masia 2017: 62). Among other reasons, this can happen for 
deceptive purposes and for the speaker’s desire to save his own “face” (Goffmann 1981) in 
risky interactions. This means that evidentiality marking ends up being a mere system of cues 
at different knowledge states and commitments in a conversation. If, on the one hand, a “wrong” 
use of evidentials can make the speaker a potential lier or an uncooperative communicator, on 
the other, it can prove to be particularly effective in constructing ideas and convictions in the 
addressee’s mind thus manipulating his representation of truth. This use of language is not un-
common in many domains of public communication; notably, political propaganda is massively 
characterized by its presence, which is why it constitutes a fertile testing ground to study evi-
dentiality phenomena and their relation to truth value assessments (cf. “Evidence and evidenti-
ality are inextricably tied to social, cultural and even political relationships among participants”; 
Fox 2001: 169). 
The present paper is concerned with a special case of broad evidentiality; more specifically, it 
addresses evidentiality marking in political discourse looking at how it is encoded through the 
presupposition and the assertion of information in a sentence. In the framework adopted in this 
work, the presupposition-assertion dichotomy is taken to inhere in the domain of microprag-
matics and, precisely, in the linguistic level known as Information Structure (Cresti 1987; Lam-
brecht 1994; Gundel/Fretheim 2004), referring to the way(s) in which sentence contents are 
distributed according to degrees of informational prominence. Integrated approaches to eviden-
tiality and information structure are still at dawn (Faller 2002; Masia 2017a, 2017b) and the 
present study is an attempt to contribute to existing contention with a further body of evidence 
from political communication, which might add grounds to current reflections on the evidential 
status of information units. In the view herein presented, presupposition and assertion hint at 
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different degrees of speaker commitment to the truth of a proposition, with presupposition sig-
naling a weaker commitment than assertion. (For a more extensive account on the relation be-
tween presupposition and commitment, cf. Sbisà (2007) and Mazzarella et al. (2018). Particu-
larly, see Mazzarella et al. (2018) for an interesting analysis of presuppositions are creating a 
“collective voice” in conversation, which accordingly leads the speaker to not take direct re-
sponsibility for the presupposed content.)1 To delve into this interaction, the present study will 
also consider the “content type” variable, namely the particular purpose with which a content 
is asserted or presupposed in an utterance. As the analysis will show, politicians’ use of presup-
positions and assertions seems to be sensitive to the function and truth value some content has 
in a given linguistic context. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the presupposition-assertion 
distinction and outlines their evidential function of marking two different epistemic stances in 
communication. Section 3 lays out the parameter I called Communicative Function, indicating 
the type of content conveyed as presupposition and/or assertion. Section 4 presents the data 
gathered from a corpus of English, French and Italian political speeches and describes the meth-
odology applied. A discussion of the results is reported in Section 5. 
2 Presupposition and assertion as evidential strategies 
2.1 Presupposition and assertion: an overview 
In a Stalnakerian perspective, presupposition can be laid out as information taken for granted 
by the speaker as belonging to the common ground of the receiver. In ordinary conversations, 
presuppositions are projected by means of lexical expressions or syntactic constructions, for 
this reason called presupposition triggers. In (3), a list of some of the most common presuppo-
sition triggers is provided (Fillmore 1971; Kiparsky/Kiparsky 1971; Sbisà 2007; Lombardi Val-
lauri 2009): 
(3) 
DEFINITE DESCRIPTION 
a. The candy box is on the TV shelf. 
ITERATIVE ADVERB  
b. Your dog has broken my vase again. 
ADDITIVE ADVERB 
c. Jane also drinks milk for breakfast. 
CHANGE OF STATE VERB 
d. Mark keeps on making noise at night. 
FACTIVE PREDICATE 
e. It’s not fair that bad students are left unpunished. 
 
1 Elsewhere (Masia 2017a), it is contended that this property of presupposition is at the very basis of its unchal-
lengeability in discourse, in that, the more commitment is shared between speaker and hearer, the less likely the 
hearer will put the presupposition into discussion 
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ADVERBIAL SUBORDINATE CLAUSES 
f. When my daughter graduated, we bought her a new car. 
WH-QUESTIONS 
g. Who broke my new lamp? 
ALTERNATIVE QUESTIONS 
h. Do you prefer whiskey or an Irish coffee? 
In (a), the definite description the candy box presupposes the existence of a candy box. In (b), 
the iterative adverb again presupposes that the dog has broken the vase before. In (c), the addi-
tive adverbial also conveys the presupposition that Jane drinks something else for breakfast 
besides milk. The change of state verb keep on, in (d), entails that Mark has been making noise 
before the utterance time. In (e), the factive predicate It’s not fair presupposes that the bad 
students are not punished. In (f), the subordinate clause presents as already known information 
that the speaker’s daughter graduated, while in (g) and (h) it is presupposed, respectively, that 
someone broke the new lamp and that the addressee wants to drink something. 
As suggested by its etymology (latin prae-supponere ‘to suppose in advance’), in presupposing 
some information, the speaker assumes or, better said, treats that information as already holding 
in the common ground of the conversation, which means that a presupposition simply recalls 
information already possessed by the receiver prior to a communicative act. Nonetheless, pre-
supposition triggers are often used to convey new presuppositions as well. In such a case, the 
presupposition is said to be “accommodated” by the receiver (Lewis 1979), in the sense that his 
mental representation of the discourse model must be updated with the meaning carried by the 
new presupposition. It must be highlighted that presupposition accommodation comes with a 
tacit acceptation of the presupposed content on the part of the addressee. In fact, in taking some 
content for granted, the speaker induces his interlocutor not to sound out its truth value thor-
oughly and shift his attention to another sentence part. This is one of the reasons why new or 
informative presuppositions may also be efficient means of persuasion: 
Sometimes, an informative presupposition also becomes persuasive as it leads the audience to see 
the world the way the author of the text sees it. This is because presupposition stealthily introduces 
dubious notions, tendentious interpretations and value judgments keeping them from critical dis-
cussion. 
(Sbisà 2007: 90)2 
Assertion belongs to that category of speech acts (Searle 1969) through which the speaker man-
ifests his belief and commitment to the truth of a proposition. 
By the very act of making an assertion, the communicator indicates that she is committing herself 
to providing the addressee with genuine information, and she intends his recognition of this com-
mitment to give him a motive for accepting a content that he would not otherwise have sufficient 
reasons to accept. 
(Sperber et al. 2010: 366) 
 
2 Original text: “A volte la presupposizione informativa diventa anche persuasiva, poiché spinge il pubblico a 
vedere il mondo nel modo voluto dall’autore del testo, perché introduce di soppiatto, e impedendone la discussione, 
entità dubbie, interpretazioni tendenziose, criteri di valore”. 
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The belief state is however not a default property of assertions, since also propositions not be-
lieved as true by the speaker can be asserted. A lazy child may lie to his mother saying 
(4) I have a terrible sorethroat. 
when in fact he is simply unwilling to go to school. In this sense, assertions can be defined as 
communicative acts with which we dispense hints at “impressions of belief” (cf. “A man makes 
an assertion if he says something in such a manner as deliberately to convey the impression of 
saying it with the overriding intention of saying something true”; Dummett 1981: 300). 
In everyday conversations, assertion takes the form of indefinite descriptions (5a) (especially 
when embedded in presentative constructions), syntactically independent clauses (5b) and non-
restrictive relative clauses (5c), among others. 
(5a) There is a candy box on the TV shelf. 
(5b) Your dog has broken my vase. 
(5c) The onions, which you put in the fridge, come from Calabria. 
We have seen that informative presuppositions update the receiver’s common ground just like 
assertions do. However, if a presupposition induces the receiver to accept a proposition as true, 
with no further truth value verification, assertion makes the updating process more conscious 
and with an in-depth evaluation of its meaning on the part of the receiver. This is also what 
makes it a more challengeable communicative act, because more attention is devoted to its full 
encoding and its truth is evaluated prior to its integration in the mental representation of the 
ongoing discourse (Lombardi Vallauri 2016). 
2.2 Assertion and presupposition as evidential strategies 
The examples of narrow and broad evidentiality in (1) and (2), respectively, epitomize cases of 
overtly grammaticalized evidential meanings. Recent typological and discourse-based studies 
(Faller 2002, Murray 2010) have gathered a cogent body of evidence on how evidential mean-
ings may also arise from the use of particular speech acts or from expectations on the construc-
tion of informational categories as the conversation unfolds (Saussure 2011; Masia 2017). In 
this latter case, evidentiality, whether narrow or broad, often does not receive overt superficial 
marking. Rather, it can be said to be pragmatically-inferred. This hypothesis leads to assume 
that if overtly grammaticalized evidentiality is only characteristic of some languages, pragmat-
ically-inferred evidentiality is a language-universal property, since all languages are endowed 
with classes of speech acts and patterns of information structure associated with the speaker’s 
choice to perspective information in some way and modulate his commitment to its truth. In 
this section, I will discuss some data that lend support to an evidential intepretation of presup-
position and assertion and, more precisely, as two manifestations of a pragmatically-inferred 
evidentiality. 
In a field work study on Cuzco Quechua evidentials, Faller (2002) observed that in this lan-
guage also evidentially unmarked assertions can convey meanings of direct evidentiality. Just 
like in its Wanka variety, also Cuzco Quechua has direct, reportative and inferential evidentials 
(among other markers). In this language, the absence of evidential markers can however be 
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classified as an evidential strategy, since plain assertions can be used to convey first-hand ex-
perience. Faller put forth this interpretation by asking her informants to judge the naturalness 
of the sentences in (6) and (7). 
(6) #Para-sha-n-mi, ichaqa mana crei-ni-chu 
 Rain-PROG-3-mi but not believe-1-NEG 
 ‘It is raining (I saw it), but I don’t believe it.’   
(7) #Para-sha-n,  ichaqa  mana crei-ni-chu  
 Rain-PROG-3, but  not  believe-1-NEG  
 ‘It is raining, but I don’t believe it.’   
Both the assertion with the direct evidential -mi and its unmarked version in (7) contain a con-
trastive clause negating the speaker’s belief attitude to the truth of the preceding proposition. 
Faller used these retraction tests to verify how strong the speaker’s commitment is perceived 
by the interlocutor. She observed that both sentence types were deemed infelicitous by her 
Quechua speakers. However, while in (6) the unacceptability hangs on the wrong use of an 
evidential marker, in (7), it is mainly driven by the misuse of an assertive speech act. She ex-
plains the anomaly stemming from (7) drawing on Vanderveken’s account (1990: 117–118) 
according to whom “all assertive illocutionary forces have the sincerity condition that the 
speaker believes the propositional content”. Therefore, denying the truth of what has been as-
serted gives rise to what she calls a Moore’s paradox: “It is paradoxical to try to perform an 
illocutionary act and to deny simultaneously one of its sincerity conditions.” (Vanderveken 
1990: 118). Faller also remarks that if in cases of mi-marked sentences evidentiality is “gram-
matically” encoded, with unmarked plain assertions evidentiality is “implicated”, which means 
that the evidential function of assertion is derived through implicatural inference and, precisely, 
through the implicit assumption that the speaker is complying with the sincerity condition of 
assertive illocutionary forces and with a believing attitude towards the expressed proposition. 
In the same way, with presupposition the reaffirmation or denial of its truth would result in an 
unfelicitous sentence. Kiparsky/Kiparsky (1971) noticed this restraint with factive propositions 
and with definite phrases. In both (8a) and (8b), it is presupposed that John is ill by means of a 
factive-dependent declarative clause and a complex definite phrase. The status of taken for 
granted information makes this proposition incompatible with presentational expressions (8a) 
or with truth assertions (8b).  
(8a) *The fact that John is ill turns out. 
(8b) *John’s being ill is true/is false. 
If some presupposed content must be taken as true by both speaker and receiver, its combination 
with predicates whose meaning is to present it as true or as novel information ends up in a 
useless and contradictory conversational move. In fact, what happens in (8a) and (8b) is that 
the speaker is informing the receiver about a truth which he already possesses (because shared 
in advance) with the result of bringing about no actual update of his mental model of discourse 
(In cooperational terms, this would amount to flouting the Gricean maxim of Quantity since the 
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speaker is not being informative and is not relevantly contributing to the development of the 
communicative exchange.) As also remarked by Stalnaker (1978): 
A speaker should not assert what he presupposes to be true, or what he presupposes to be false. 
Given the meaning of presupposition and the essential effect ascribed to the act of assertion, this 
should be clear. To assert something incompatible with what is presupposed is self-defeating: one 
wants to reduce the context set, but not eliminate it altogether. And to assert something which is 
already presupposed is to attempt to do something that is already done.  
(Stalnaker 1978: 325) 
These properties of assertion and presupposition provide some grounding to further assess their 
correlation to two different perspectives that speakers can take in an interaction. I will flesh out 
this reflection drawing on a classification of epistemic stances proposed by Mushin (2001). In 
a comparative study on narrative retelling in Macedonian, Japanese and English, Mushin (2001) 
pinned down five different epistemological3 stances that can be taken by speakers in describing 
states of affairs. These are the personal experience stance, the reportive stance, the inferential 
stance, the imaginative stance and the factual stance. Two stances of her taxonomy will be at 
issue in this section, namely personal experience and factual stance. Mushin describes the adop-
tion of a personal experience epistemic stance as involving the representation of information as 
“the product of the conceptualizer’s direct and conscious perceptual experience. In many cases, 
the speaker is the only person who has access to the truth of the information. […] these are 
contexts where the conceptualizer has witnessed an externally perceivable event” (Mushin 
2001: 59). She also notices that one of the ways in which a personal experience epistemic stance 
can be linguistically realized is through the mention of private states and speaker intentions. 
We have seen before that a cooperative use of assertion comes with the assumption that (a) the 
speaker can be held responsible for the truth of the asserted proposition, and (b) that he is con-
veying that proposition as his main communicative intention in the ongoing interaction. Now, 
to me, the expectation of the speaker’s having witnessed the state of affairs described is what 
equates a personal experience stance to the function of assertive speech acts, namely that of 
tying the speaker to the truth of the information conveyed. Indeed, if assertion entails that 
the speaker has adequate evidence for a proposition, it follows that the perspective it codifies is 
more akin to that encoded by direct and first-hand evidentials. Personal experience stance can 
thus be characterized as a particular type of broad evidentiality, and assertion can be seen as 
one of its grammatical (and pragmatic) manifestations. 
When the speaker’s intention is to leave the information source unexpressed, he may choose to 
adopt a factual epistemic stance. According to Mushin, this stance is normally taken by speakers 
when some exchanged information is believed to be shared in advance by everybody, and so 
any explicit indication of the source is not relevant. 
Adoption of a factual epistemological stance is reflected in the absence of any representation of 
the source of information (and its status) in the construal. Adoption of a factual epistemological 
stance typically implies either that the information is assumed to be known by everyone in the 
 
3 From now on, I will use the term “epistemic” in place of “epistemological”, this latter being more closely asso-
ciated with the disciplinary approach to knowledge, rather than to its justification. 
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speech community as general cultural knowledge or, more generally, that the source of infor-
mation is unimportant to the establishment of the validity of the information. 
(Mushin 2001: 74)  
The author also remarks that in conveying some content from a factual stance, the speaker does 
not “own up to the fact that what they are talking about is their own representation of events” 
(Mushin 2001: 75). In fact, if some information is assumed to be shared by everybody, the 
speaker’s representation of it must necessarily be the same as that of his interlocutors, and so 
the speaker cannot be qualified as the only first-hand experiencer of a fact, for he shares this 
knowledge with the receiver. We have seen that one way of presenting some knowledge as 
shared in a conversation is by presupposing it. 
The properties that tie presupposition and assertion to the two evidential meanings above de-
scribed are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Type and function of the evidentiality encoded by presupposition and assertion 
Mushin remarks that in taking on a personal experience stance, the speaker’s reliability is more 
likely to be addressed in conversation, whereas with a factual stance the same possibility is on 
the whole more reduced because the information at stake is presented as more widely shared 
(Mushin 2001: 75: “The fact that the speaker can be questioned with regard to source of infor-
mation is evidence that the information is not yet ‘public property’”). Givón (1982) outlines 
this challengeability parameter also as a distinctive trait of two types of propositions and high-
lights their compatibility with evidential marking: 
(a) Propositions which are to be taken for granted, via the force of diverse conventions, as un-
challengeable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidentiary justifications by the speaker. 
(b) Propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, are open to challenge by the hearer 
and thus require – or admit – evidentiary justification. [emphases are mine]. 
(Givón 1982: 24) 
That assertions admit evidential expressions to be placed within their syntactic domain is well 
illustrated by the following examples: 
(9a) I assure that Jane is pregnant. 
(9b) I’ve been told that Jane is pregnant. 
(9c) It seems that Jane is pregnant. 
Strategy Evidentiality type Speaker’s attitude 
ASSERTION Personal experience evidentiality 
The speaker presents himself as 
the only source of the asserted 
state of affairs and he is the one to 
commit to its truth. 
PRESUPPOSITION Factual evidentiality 
The speaker conveys some infor-
mation as already part of the re-
ceiver’s common ground 
knowledge. Both speaker and  
receiver commit to the truth of the 
information negotiated. 
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What makes the sentences in (9) possible is the fact that when some knowledge is only pos-
sessed by the speaker, he is free to do “anything he wants with it”: he may strengthen his com-
mitment to its truth, or all the way detach from it. This liberty is instead much more constrained 
with presupposition, which seems resistant to hosting either direct, conjectural or indirect evi-
dentials within its scope: 
(10a) ??When I assure Mark left for Finland, his girlfriend was studying in Rome 
(10b) ??When seemingly/apparently Jane got pregnant, her parents were in London 
(10c) ??It’s strange that probably Andrew bought a new house 
The oddity of the sentences in (10) hangs on the fact that if presupposed information is assumed 
to be in the common ground of both interlocutors and both are expected to believe it as true, 
any retraction from this stance (on the part of the speaker) would be logically inconsistent. 
Consequently, the likelihood of having some presupposed content challenged by the receiver is 
on the whole more shrinked, as it would contravene the assumption of shared belief and shared 
commitment established by presupposition packaging. 
3 Communicative functions and challengeability 
The other variable relevant to the present study is the type of content being packaged as pre-
supposition or as assertion. Building on terminologies caught on in previous studies (Graham 
et al. 2013; Brocca/Garassino/Masia 2016), I will refer to this variable as the Communicative 
Function (henceforth, CF) of the presupposition or the assertion, meaning, by this, the particular 
intention with which some content is verbalized by the speaker. Drawing on taxonomies devel-
oped in previous works (Akshay et al. 2007, Boyd et al. 2010), the analysis will consider the 
following four CFs: 
- ATTACK: criticism of unfavorable characteristics or flaws of a political opponent or group 
(Lee/Xu 2017); 
- SELF-PRAISE: a positive statement about oneself or one’s own policy (Dayter 2014) 
- STANCE-TAKING: expression of one’s position or stand on a particular issue (Evans 2016)4 
- NEUTRAL: message providing objective information or agenda announcements (Graham et 
al. 2013)  
These four CFs are among the most diffused and represented in political propaganda, in both 
traditional and more recent means of mass communication (i. e. Facebook, Twitter, etc). In the 
previous section, I laid out assertion and presupposition as increasing or reducing the level of 
challengeability of some content. For the purpose of the analysis, the challengeability parameter 
will also be considered as characterizing the discursive effects of the four CFs outlined above 
and, precisely, the ease with which they might threaten the addressee’s face (Goffman 1981) 
and thus trigger a critical reaction on his part. We may in this sense distinguish between a 
packaging-driven and a content-driven challengeability, the former inhering in the packaging 
properties of presupposition and assertion, the latter in the truth value of the content they carry. 
 
4 Ushchyna (2015) outlines the process of stance-taking as also concerned with mechanisms of identity construc-
tion.  
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Recent threads of research on politicians’ communicative behavior in public speeches and in 
microblogging (Lombardi Vallauri/Masia 2014; Brocca/Garassino/Masia. 2016) highlighted 
the different impact of these CFs on the receiver’s “face” and personal building of ideological 
consensus. Lee/Xu (2017) describe Attack as zooming in on an issue on which the speaker has 
more credibility but on which the opponent is weaker. An attacking message thus accentuates 
the opponent’s unfavorable characteristics and flaws, especially in the mind of those with low 
level of political knowledge (Lee/Xu 2017: 11). Since its raison d’ȇtre mainly involves inducing 
potential voters to think badly of an opponent and become convinced of the speaker’s trustful-
ness, the strongly negative addressee-oriented character of an attacking CF is what makes it 
expectably more challengeable in a speech. As a matter of fact, the speaker may also lie about 
his opponent and smear his reputation on the basis of false information. 
In their volume on politness, Brown/Levinson (1987) describe self-praise as a strongly face-
threatening act because it entails a “raising of the self and a lowering of the other” (Dayter 
2014: 92); therefore, in praising himself, the speaker does not care about the hearer’s feelings 
(Brown/Levinson 1987: 67). Dayter also remarks that in self-praising, the speaker flouts 
Leech’s Modesty Maxim (Leech 1983: 132) stating that, in order to be polite in an interaction, 
the speaker should “minimize the expression of praise of self and maximize the expression of 
dispraise of self”. In the same way as Attack, also a Self-praising CF may involve untrue con-
tents, by which the speaker manipulates the truth values of his messages to subtly instill a pos-
itive representation of himself in the voters’ minds. Owing to these potential manipulatory ef-
fects, I assume the Self-praising CF to be equally challengeable, although, maybe, slightly less 
challengeable than Attack, this latter being more strongly impacting and threatening for a third 
person’s reputation. 
On a lower position in the challengeability scale, we can find the Stance-taking and the Neutral 
CFs. Stance-taking is a subjective and inter-subjective process (Bucholtz/Hall 2005) through 
which the politician re-affirms his own identity and adherence to the ideology of a political 
group. Reinforcement of one’s stance on a certain issue delineates the speaker’s perspective 
and solidifies his bond to the principles and tenets of his political party or movement. Compared 
to the former CFs, the persuasive effects of Stance-taking are not expected to be as far-reaching 
as those described above. On a priori bases, it would be odd to assume the speaker’s expression 
of a belief or an opinion to elude some form of veracity. In fact, if this were the case, he would 
adopt a contradictory conversational move towards his own credibility. The Neutral function is 
probably the farthest from a prototypical challengeable attitude, due to its correlation with 
purely objective and factual contents. 
Now, building on the foregoing considerations and assuming the challengeability parameter to 
develop in a gradient from more to less challengeable types of contents, I suggest viewing the 
four CFs distributed as follows: 
Attack Self-praising Stance-taking Informative 
 
+ CHALLENGEABILITY - 
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The predictions for the present study can therefore be framed as an inversely proportional rela-
tion between the packaging and the content levels of the challengeability parameter. In this 
sense, more challengeable CFs (Attack, Self-praise) are expected to be encoded by a less chal-
lengeable packaging strategy, namely presupposition, carrying meanings of factual evidential-
ity. Conversely, less challengeable CFs (Stance-taking, Neutral) are expected to find encoding 
in a more challengeable packaging strategy, i. e. assertion, codifying a personal experience type 
of evidentiality. The reason for predicting this scenario is that the speaker can be thought to feel 
less confident in committing to information which he knows that might be doubtful about his 
own reputation or that of his opponent. In fact, he may deliberately lie in boasting himself (by, 
say, highlighting potentially untrue positive qualities about himself or his own party) as well as 
in attacking other people (e. g. stating untrue facts about their policy and future programmes), 
yet opt for conversational moves that render the detection of such lies and attacks less straight-
forward: he presupposes it because, in this way, he presents it as if it is already known by the 
receiver, thereby discouraging any attempt at addressing their veracity. In a different way, the 
politician may be expected to devote assertive strategies to the encoding of stance-taking and 
neutral CFs because, as already said, these functions are more weakly tendentious and less 
likely to involve doubtful contents. As a matter of fact, the speaker hardly has something to 
lose in simply stating his own opinion on something or in reporting factual information; so, he 
feels more confident in adopting a committal attitude towards the purpose of his message. This 
packaging-content challengeability interaction is better illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Interactions between levels of content challengeability and packaging challengeability 
The opposing direction of the two clines indicates that an increase in the challengeability degree 
of a CF corresponds to a decreasing challengeability of the packaging strategy, and vice versa. 
If our predictions are correct, we should expect these trends to be confirmed by our results. 
4 Research questions and methodology 
4.1 Corpus 
As anticipated in the outset, the analysis aims to gauge politicians’ use of presupposition and 
assertion, namely, of more or less challengeable packaging strategies, in association with more 
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or less challengeable CFs. For the study, 37 texts have been collected for a total amount of 
102.211 words. 
The corpus includes speeches from the U. S., French and Italian campaigns held between 2014 
and 2017. For each language and country, two political leaders have been considered: Barack 
Obama and Hillary Clinton for the U. S., François Hollande (Parti Socialiste) and Marine Le 
Pen (Front National) for France, and Matteo Renzi (Democratic Party) and Matteo Salvini (The 
League) for Italy (see Table 2). 
 Country Politicians Extension (n. words) 
 U. S. A. Barack Obama Hillary Clinton 31.274 
 France François Hollande Marine Le Pen 36.167 
 ITALY Matteo Renzi 
Matteo Salvini 
34.770 
 Total  102.211 
Table 2: Composition of the corpus 
For assertions, the region of interest coincides with a full-fledged independent proposition, 
whereas for the presupposition packaging type, all information encoded within the trigger syn-
tactic domain has been taken into account. Some examples will clarify this criterion. 
(11) 
REGIONS OF INTEREST FOR PRESUPPOSITION5 
a. [When the other side refuses to compromise]PRES, progress can stall. (Obama 2016) 
b. I believe that here in America our success should depend on [the strength of our work 
ethic.]PRES (Obama 2016) 
c. Let’s continue that progress with a smarter tax policy that [stops giving $ 4 billion a year 
to fossil fuel industries that don’t need it.]PRES  (Obama 2014) 
d. Ecco perché, quando sento parlare di mafia, [con la leggerezza con cui anche questa mattina 
è risuonata questa parola]PRES, avverto un brivido di dolore.  (Renzi 2014) 
 [‘This is why, when I hear talking about mafia, with the superficiality with which also this 
morning this word resounded, I have thrills of hurt’] 
e. L’occasion est trop belle pour ne pas, aujourd’hui, rendre hommage aussi à travers elles à 
toutes les femmes de France qui, aujourd’hui, se lèvent pour [continuer ce combat lumi-
neux de la transmission et de l’amour de la Nation]PRES  (Le Pen 2015) 
 [‘The occasion is too beautiful to not pay tribute, also through them, to all women of France 
who, today, raise to keep on with this struggle of transmission and love of the Nation’] 
 
5 The bold-typed expressions indicate the presupposition triggers within the whole sentence portion which it in-
cludes. 
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REGIONS OF INTEREST FOR ASSERTION 
f. [Noi siamo abituati a confrontarci in modo non formale.]ASS (Renzi 2014) 
 ‘We are used to talk to each other in an informal way’. 
g. [Our economy isn’t working the way it should.]ASS  (Clinton 2016) 
h. [43 million workers have no paid sick leave.]ASS  (Obama 2015) 
i. Ils sont le fait d’une armée djihadiste, le groupe Daech qui nous combat parce que [la France 
est un pays de liberté.]ASS  (Hollande 2015) 
 ‘It is a jihadist army, the Daech group, that we fight, because France is a country of freedom’  
4.2 Annotation and computation criteria 
With the methodological premises set out in the previous section, the first step in the analysis 
involved annotating all speeches according to the Packaging strategy (presupposition or asser-
tion) used and the Communicative Function (CF) performed (Attack, Self-praise, Stance-tak-
ing, Neutral). Before going into the details of the methodology, a few preliminary remarks are 
in order. Given the different length of the speeches and the variety of communicative styles 
exhibited by the politicians, the total number of attacking, self-praising, stance-taking and neu-
tral contents turned out to be not uniform. As a matter of fact, throughout the gathered corpus, 
some politicians expressed a greater amount of given content types than other politicians, inde-
pendently of the topic being tackled. So, to avoid biases due to unbalanced datasets, 300 tokens 
have been selected for each CF, for a total of 1.200 occurrences. Moreover, with a view to 
preventing a random selection from possibly favouring some CFs to the detriment of others, the 
occurrences have been singled out in the same order as they appeared in the discourses exam-
ined, irrespective of the packaging strategy they instantiated. Because of the variety of topics 
and contexts in which the speeches have been held by the politicians, the distribution and con-
centration of CF items is obviously uneven throughout the 37 discourses considered, therefore 
a progressive extraction could preserve a reasonable level of objectivity in the construction of 
the 1.200-item corpus. To ensure that all political characters were equally represented, 200 oc-
currences each (50 per CF) have been taken. The final corpus thus appears structured as in 
Table 3. 
 U. S. A. Total 
CFs 
country 
FRANCE Tot. CFs 
country 
ITALY Total 
CFs 
country 
Total 
CFs CF Barack 
Obama 
Hillary 
Clinton 
François 
Hollande 
Marine 
Le Pen 
Matteo 
Renzi 
Matteo 
Salvini 
Attack 50 50 100 50 50 100 50 50 100 
Self-
praise 
50 50 100 50 50 100 50 50 100 
Stance-
taking 
50 50 100 50 50 100 50 50 100 
Neutral 50 50 100 50 50 100 50 50 100 
Totals 200 200 400 200 200 400 200 200 400 1.200 
Table 3: Distribution of the items of CFs forming the final corpus 
The reason for previously annotating the selected items for the packaging strategy they dis-
played hinges on the need to identify clear-cut boundaries for the relevant units of information. 
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Owing to the high frequency of digressions, structurally incomplete sentences, incidental 
phrases, hesitations, etc., a preliminary annotation based on the syntactic extention of the CF 
expressed would have rendered the mapping of the four CFs onto specific packaging strategies 
a burdensome task. The presuppositions and assertions found in the corpus therefore instantiate 
parts of larger CF units whose boundaries were not always straightforwardly determined. What 
matters to the purpose of the analysis, though, is that the critical region represented by the 
presuppositive or the assertive construction could unambiguously be categorized as encoding a 
specific CF. 
As a second step in the analysis, the frequency with which attacks, self-praises, stance-taking 
and neutral contents received presupposition or assertion packaging has been assessed dividing 
the total number of presuppositive and assertive encodings of each CF by the total number of 
CF occurrences in the corpus, as illustrated in the following algorithm. 
Single occurrence of CF ˄ pres/ass packaging strategy 
 
Total n. of occurrences of CFs 
The index resulting from this ratio thus indicates how frequently a presupposition or an asser-
tion is used to express a given CF. For greater convenience, I will call this parameter frequency 
coefficient. For example, if, on a total of 150 occurrences of Attack, 53 receive presupposition 
packaging, this means that 35% of the attacking contents of the corpus are conveyed as taken 
for granted information and, correspondingly, as marked with a meaning of factual evidential-
ity. The remaining 97 occurrences (65% of the total) will be expressed assertively, that is, with 
a meaning of personal experience evidentiality. 
4.3 Research questions and methodology 
Building on the considerations expressed in the previous sections, the interplay of Packaging 
and CF is expected to be contingent on the challengeability parameter. Notably, given the two-
level challengeability outlined in Section 3, presuppositions, which encode a factual type of 
evidentiaity and epitomize a less challengeable discourse strategy, are predicted to associate 
more frequently with highly challengeable content types (Attack and Self-praise). Conversely, 
assertion, codifying a personal experience type of evidentiality and representing a more chal-
lengeable discourse strategy, is expected to correlate more frequently with weakly challengea-
ble content types (Stance-taking and Neutral). 
To assess the trends of the above-mentioned parameters, the frequency coefficients for all CFs 
in association with the two packaging strategies have been considered. As already said, this 
value should inform us on the degree to which the Packaging parameter correlates with the CF 
parameter, and, therefore, on the politician’s preferred evidential and discourse strategy to en-
code different CFs. 
4.4 Results 
In this section, the graphicated frequency coefficients (cf. Table 4) associated to the two pack-
aging types are reported for the whole corpus of 1.200 items (Figure 2) and for each country 
separately (Figures 3–5). 
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CF PRESUPPOSITION ASSERTION 
Attack 0.63 0.36 
Self-praise 0.76 0.23 
Stance-taking 0.11 0.89 
Neutral 0.15 0.86 
Table 4: Frequency coefficients for all CFs 
 
Figure 2: Frequency Coefficients of the four CFs for Presupposition and Assertion 
 
Figure 3: Frequency Coefficients for English speeches 
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
Attack
Self-praise
Stance-taking
Neutral
Frequency coefficients for the four CFs
ASS PRES
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
Attack Self-praise Stance-taking Neutral
U.S.A 
PRES ASS
Viviana Masia: Presupposition, assertion and the encoding of evidentiality in political discourse 
 
ISSN 1615-3014  
145
 
Figure 4: Frequency Coefficients for Italian speeches 
 
Figure 5: Frequency Coefficients for French speeches 
Quite in line with our predictions, the frequency coefficients displayed in Figure 2 report a 
remarkable difference in the distribution of Attacking, Self-praising, Stance-taking and Neutral 
contents between presuppositional and assertive strategies. This observation also has a rather 
robust statistical support (t = 4.36, p-value = 0.003).6 
Throughout the corpus, the most widespread use of assertion is to encode Stance-taking, fol-
lowed by Neutral, Attack and Self-praise. Conversely, the most frequent use of presupposition 
is to encode Self-praise, followed by Attack, Neutral and Stance-taking. Looking at the data 
gleaned for each country, these trends are particularly visible in English and French speeches, 
whereas for the Italian sub-corpus, presupposition seems to be more tightly associated with 
Attack, although with a slight difference from the CF-Packaging matching registered for Self-
praise. Three one-sample t-tests run for the datasets collected for the three countries reveal that 
the significance in the different distribution of presupposition and assertion packaging among 
the four CFs is consistent for the three countries (U. S. A.: t = 4.12, p-value = 0.004; Italy: t = 
4.18, p-value = 0.004; France: t = 3.77, p-value = 0.006). 
 
6 T-test is a type of test used in inferential statistics to determine whether the mean difference between two groups 
of observations is significant. A t-value greater than 2 and a p-value less than 0.05 is generally taken to point to a 
significant difference between the groups of means observed.  
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An a priori consideration that can be made is that politicians are generally more leaning towards 
“taking for granted” contents targeted at boasting themselves, their policy or their party and 
towards strongly committing to contents whose function is to strengthen the speaker’s ideolog-
ical stance or to inform the audience about events or agenda announcements. Further remarks 
on the results obtained are reported in the following section. 
5 Discussion 
The purpose of the study was to inquire the evidential function of presupposition and assertion 
looking at the way they are used in political discourse. As is known, politicians’ way of speak-
ing is teeming with strategic conversational moves aimed at persuading the audience (Lombardi 
Vallauri/Masia 2014, 2016). These moves often entail perspective-taking mechanisms with cor-
responding modulations of commitment degrees. Proceeding from Fox’s view that evidence 
and evidentiality are inextricably tied to political relationships among participants in an inter-
action (Fox 2001), I found that political discourse might serve as a suitable setting to explore 
how evidential meanings are built and what discourse strategies politicians resort to to convey 
them. The relation that the presupposition-assertion dichotomy bears on evidentiality and, pre-
cisely, on a broad type of evidentiality, has been probed assuming these two units of information 
packaging as marking two distinct epistemic stances in conversation and, correspondingly, two 
distinct types of speaker attitude evidentiality. The factual evidentiality encoded by presuppo-
sition is indicative of a more shared commitment to the truth of a proposition. We have seen 
that this interpretation hangs on the property of presupposition to place some information within 
the epistemic territory of both speaker and receiver (Heritage 2012), which makes it, so to say, 
“watertight” against potential addressability. As a matter of fact, in challenging a content which 
he also believes as true, the receiver would adopt an uncooperative and inconsistent communi-
cative behavior. Experimental studies in the psycholinguistic domain have buttressed this ad-
dressability-resistant attitude of presuppositions (Amaral/Cummins 2015). 
The frequency coefficients calculated to assess how often presupposition and assertion are used 
to encode specific communicative functions (CF) confirm our prediction that contents more 
likely to be face-threatening for the speaker or for a political rival tend to receive presupposi-
tional encoding. Considering the evidential characterization put forward for presupposition, this 
trend can be thought to hinge on the shared-commitment effect triggered by presupposition. On 
a priori bases, in the discourses examined, the speaker seems to follow the general rule that 
when a content risks to smear his reputation in the opinion of his voters, it is preferable to make 
voters likewise responsible for the content negotiated. An efficient device to achieve this is by 
making them “holders” of the same content, yet without making them aware of this state of 
knowing. One of the reasons why presupposition can effectively serve this communicative pur-
pose is also the impact it wields on the receiver’s attentional processes. The experimental liter-
ature is nowadays abundant on the way presupposition reduces attention on some information, 
thereby inducing a shallow decoding of its truth (Loftus 1975, Langford/Holmes 1979, Schwarz 
2015). So, in conveying some content as presupposed, not only is the speaker introducing that 
content in the receiver’s common ground, but he is also providing him with the instruction of 
devoting a lesser attention to it and accept it as it is with no deeper inspection of its truth con-
ditional meaning. As it can be easily deduced, if this has harmless repercussions for contents 
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the receiver actually knows in advance, when it comes to new presuppositions, this may conceal 
insidious manipulatory intents (Sbisà 2007, Lombardi Vallauri/Masia 2014). Although danger-
ous for the construction of a well-informed electorate, this state of things is (regrettably) at the 
basis of persuasive propaganda worldwide. So, besides commitment degrees, the evidentiality 
encoded by presupposition and assertion also has remarkable (yet still under investigation) psy-
chological correlates. 
The distribution of frequency coefficients (Figure 2, Table 3) also confirms the expectation of 
a strong interaction between assertive packaging and weakly tendentious CFs. The low chal-
lengeability of Stance-taking and Neutral CFs in the challengeability continuum suggested has 
been put down to the fact that politicians are generally believed to have scant, if any, persuasive 
needs in simply expressing opinions (e. g. Clinton in a 2017 speech: “…we want diversity in 
everything we do in our country…”) or agenda announcements (e. g. Obama in a 2016 speech: 
“I’m putting Joe in charge of mission control”). Having nothing to lose in conveying these 
content types, the politician feels freer to manifest her commit to their truth. Indeed, as already 
argued in Section 3, in lying about his own stance or fixed agenda plans, not only would the 
speaker appear uncooperative, but he would also look as if he is disavowing his identity as 
member of his political group with respect to certain ideological concerns. These two CFs seem 
to positively interact with the speaker and receiver’s face since they are not directly targeted at 
either blasting somebody else or constructing tendentious ideas in voters’ minds. A stronger 
commitment in this case would therefore not risk to abate the speaker’s authority and credibil-
ity. Similarly to presupposition, also the cognitive treatment of assertion has been the object of 
psycholinguistic investigation. Offline and online behavioral studies (Hornby 1973, Lang-
ford/Holmes 1979, Birch/Rayner 1997) report a more effortful processing for asserted contents 
and a more thorough mental representation of their truth value in the receiver’s mind. If, with 
presupposition, the epistemic condition of shared commitment has a cognitive correlate in at-
tention-reduction – because the information is presented as already shared – with assertion, the 
stronger commitment manifested by the speaker is underpinned by a greater attentional effort. 
So, in evidential terms, the speaker’s taking a personal experience stance provides the receiver 
with the instruction to pay greater attention to the content being conveyed. 
The trends reported in Figure 2 also show that the difference between Self-praise and Attack in 
presupposition use is greater than the difference between Neutral and Stance-taking in the use 
of assertion. The general tendency of politicians to presuppose self-praises can be explained, 
among other things, appealing to the two-fold challengeability effect accompanying Self-prais-
ing contents. Quoting Brown/Levinson (1987), Self-praise can be thought to entail two com-
municative acts: one, more explicit, aimed at expressing self-flattering information; the other, 
more implicit, hinting at a minimization of the receiver or of other addressees. This feature of 
self-praising information is well illustrated by the following example from Marine Le Pen’s 
speech: 
(12) J’appelle en ce premier mai tous les patriotes de France, d’où qu’ils viennent, quel que soit 
leur engagement politique passé, à me rejoindre. Qu’il rejoigne le seul parti qui sait où il va, 
pourquoi il y va, et qui ne s’embarrasse pas de ces querelles d’égos, qui reste sur le fond des 
projets, qui propose une voie aux Français! 
(Le Pen: 2016) 
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Here, the defining relative clause le seul parti qui sait où il va presupposes that there is only 
one party which knows where to go. Moreover, by means of implicature, it is also inferred that 
this one party is the Front National and, correspondingly, that other parties so far have never 
known where to go. 
A similar case is the following excerpt from Obama’s speech: 
(13) What was true then can be true now. Our unique strength as a nation, our optimism and work 
ethic, our spirit of discovery, our diversity, our commitment to rule of law – these things give 
us everything we need to ensure prosperity and security for generations to come. 
(Obama: 2016) 
Here, not only do the bold-typed definite descriptions presuppose that the United States have a 
unique strength, are optimistic, have a spirit of discovery and have a sense of commitment to 
rule, but the emphasis placed on the possessive adjective our also conveys the idea that all these 
qualities are not matched to the same degree by other countries. Also in this case, the speaker’s 
intention to boast himself (or his country) and to downgrade the others can be retrieved via 
implicatural mechanisms (Grice 1975). As a matter of fact, any nation has a somewhat unique 
strength, different than that of other nations, and any nation had some spirit of discovery in the 
past. By the same token, any population is made of law-abiding citizens and people who are 
more prone to flout the rules. So, since Obama’s persuasive intent cannot be to state mere tru-
isms, the real informative goal underlying the utterance of those definite phrases must be that 
those qualities are possessed by Americans in a special and peculiar way, which makes the 
condition of being American something to be proud of. 
The impact of presupposition on the challengeability degree of some content is also remarkable 
on attacking content types. Consider the (corpus) sentences in (14) and (15) and their reformu-
lation in (14a) and (15a). 
(14) Le decisions arbitraries du ministère finissent par exaspérer des professionels, qui ont 
l’impression qu’on essaie de les court-circuiter. (Le Pen: 2016) 
(14a) Le ministère a pris des decisions arbitraries et ceux-ci finissent par exaspérer des profes-
sionels, qui ont l’impression qu’on essaie de les court-circuiter. 
(15) When Congress is dysfunctional we should draw our districts to encourage politicians to 
cater to common sense and not rigid extremes. (Obama: 2017) 
(15a) Congress can be dysfunctional. That’s why we should draw our districts to encourage 
politicians to cater to common sense and not rigid extremes. 
In (14), while the fact that ministeries have made arbitrary choices is treated as taken-for-
granted knowledge by means of a definite description, in (14a) the same content is conveyed as 
a more relevant and purposeful component of the speaker’s message, since, through assertive 
encoding, it is brought to a foregrounded position. Similarly, in (15), that Congress has been or 
can be dysfunctional is backgrounded and treated as secondary and already known information 
as compared to its assertive version in (15a), where it is verbalized as plain assertion. A straight-
forward effect that can be noticed from these comparisons is that, in hearing (14) and (15), the 
receiver is, so to say, subtly induced to restructure his mental model of discourse by tacitly 
accepting the fact that ministeries have made arbitrary decisions and that Congress is dysfunc-
tional, since, in a way, presupposition surreptitiously leads him/her to take on the position of 
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“knower” of those states of affairs, along with the speaker. And it is precisely this stance that 
prevents him from inquiring their truth. On the contrary, by hearing (14a) and (15a), the receiver 
more strongly perceives those contents as not belonging to his epistemic territory (otherwise 
the speaker would not convey them as the communicative aim of his message) and so he feels 
in the condition to doubt about their truth and eventually challenge it. 
The frequency coefficient values of Stance-taking and Neutral contents in the use of assertion 
confirm the relevance of this pragmatic marker of personal experience evidentiality in the en-
coding of weakly challengeable information. Presupposition use appears slightly more frequent 
with Neutral contents, compared to Stance-taking ones. This behavior may be suggestive of the 
speaker’s necessity to put the neutral content in the background, thus focusing some other sen-
tence unit(s). The incidence of this conversational move is however feeble throughout the whole 
corpus, meaning that the speaker is more likely to increase the addressees’ level of attention on 
contents which do not deserve an in-depth critical evaluation, whereas those whose truth is 
more prone to be more dubious are “passed” below the level of critical attention and are, for 
this purpose, presupposed. 
On balance, what the results confirm is a fairly strong content-oriented use of presupposition 
and assertion strategies in the political speeches examined. On a priori grounds, this pattern 
reveals a general sensitivity of political speakers to utter their messages taking into account the 
effects that both the contents conveyed and the way they are packaged might produce on the 
recipient. So, if, in Lambrecht’s terms, information structure reflects “the speaker’s assumption 
about the hearer’s state of knowledge and awareness at the time of an utterance” (Lambrecht 
1994: xiii), this property seems to be less compelling in messages uttered for persuasive aims. 
Indeed, in these contexts of language use the achitecture of sentences’ information structure 
does not pre-eminently look at the receiver’s knowledge state, given that packaging criteria and 
activation states of contents often do not match in political speeches, but rather look at the 
receiver’s potential reaction to the truth of the information conveyed.7 “Reaction” is here in-
tended to refer to assumptions of credibility, evaluation of trustfulness, the speaker’s honesty 
and addressability in case of contents of dubious veracity. The way receivers handle these as-
pects of their interactional behavior will determine the extent to which the speaker’s reputation 
risks to be smeared or damaged. In order to keep this risk under control, the speaker might 
benefit from reducing any chance to be addressed for what he says and, at the same time, 
achieve her/his manipulative intent of “injecting” ideas in the receiver’s mind. These epis-
temic/evidential properties of information structure is what makes it an effective strategy to get 
 
7 As rightfully noticed by Sbisà (2007), public communicators often do not care about whether certain contents 
will be easily reconstructed by the receiver. What rather seems to matter to them is that the text/discourse is 
“usable” as it is (Ibid: 14: “l’effettiva ricostruibilità di un senso da parte dei fruitori è l’ultimo pensiero da parte 
dei comunicatori e a questo punto, forse, dei fruitori stessi. Se qualunque testo, purché apparentemente coeso, può 
ricevere nella fruizione qualunque senso – basta che sia usato, consumato – non occorre certo darsi pena, né che 
sia comprensibile, né che contenga effettivamente qualche cosa da comprendere; né occorre darsi pena di com-
prendere questo qualcosa.”, English translation: “The retreadability of a content on the part of text users is the last 
thing on communicators’ minds and, maybe, also the last thing for the users themselves. If any text, although 
apparently cohesive, can be used in some way – as long as it is used and read – there is no need to bother for its 
understandability, nor for the presence of anything to be understood, nor is there any need to worry about under-
standing this something.”). 
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messages across and easily convince receivers of their veracity as well as of the speaker’s reli-
ability. 
Needless to say, the foregoing considerations could certainly benefit from extending the pro-
posed research to a wider corpus of political speeches, hopefully selected according to a more 
systematic balancing of parameters such as topic, context, political group, year, etc. Added to 
this, more fine-grained methodologies of descriptive and inferential statistics would no doubt 
clarify the scenario emerged from the analysis and reveal more straightforward and sharply 
defined patterns of interactions between the presupposition-assertion level and the types of con-
tent they encode. This contribution then wishes to be a first gambit in the direction of gathering 
and delving into more telling pieces of evidence of the relation between evidentiality and infor-
mation structure. 
6 Conclusion 
What this study sought to demonstrate is that the presupposition and assertion of contents may 
have evidential purposes. The evidentiality encoded by these two strategies of information 
packaging is of a broad type (Chafe/Nichols 1986), as it entails different degress and strengths 
of manifestation of the speaker’s commitment to truth. I have proposed to appraise this eviden-
tial facet with relation to specific types of content in political speech in which the use of pre-
supposition and assertion appears to be remarkably sensitive to the challengeability of the con-
tent they encode. In the corpus considered for the analysis, the discourse strategies adopted by 
politicians reveal an inverse relation between the challengeability associated with presupposi-
tion and assertion packaging and that stemming from the content being conveyed. Due to the 
underdeveloped research on information structure and evidentiality encoding, a more exhaus-
tive account of the data gleaned from the present inquiry certainly calls for fine-tuning the 
methodology put to test and extend it to other domains of language use. 
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Annex 
List of Abbrviations 
1 First person subject 
2 Second person subject 
3 Third person subject 
1P First person possessor 
ACC Accusative 
ASS Assertion 
CAUS Causative 
DIR Direct 
EMPH Emphatic 
EVID Evidential 
GEN Genitive 
IMPRF Imperfective 
INFER Inferential 
NAR Narrative 
NEG Negation 
PRES Presupposition 
PL Plural 
PLUPRF Pluperfect 
PROG Progressive 
PST Past 
REFL Reflextive 
REPORT Reportative 
 
